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ABSTRACT
Following a series of high profile miscarriages of justice in the UK linked to questionable
expert evidence, the post of the Forensic Science Regulator was created in 2008. The main
objective of this role is to improve the standard of practitioner competencies and forensic
procedures. One of the key strategies deployed to achieve this is the push to incorporate
a greater level of scientific conduct in the various fields of forensic practice. Currently,
there is no statutory requirement for practitioners to become accredited to continue working
with the Criminal Justice System of England and Wales. However, the Forensic Science
Regulator is lobbying the UK Government to make this mandatory. This paper focuses on
the challenge of incorporating a scientific methodology to digital forensic investigations where
malicious software (‘malware’) has been identified. One aspect of such a methodology is the
approach followed to both select and evaluate the tools used to perform dynamic malware
analysis during an investigation. Based on the literature, legal, regulatory, and practical
needs, we derive a set of requirements to address this challenge. We present a framework,
called the ‘Malware Analysis Tool Evaluation Framework’ (MATEF), to address this lack of
methodology to evaluate software tools used to perform dynamic malware analysis during
investigations involving malware and discuss how it meets the derived requirements.
Keywords: malware forensics, digital forensics, tool testing, expert evidence, trust, requirements

1.

INTRODUCTION

It is not uncommon during cybercrime investigations to discover malware. In R v
Oliver (R v Oliver [2016] EWCA Crim 1053),
a ‘Trojan defense’ was offered to account for
the presence of indecent images on a computer, while in R v Dan (R v Dan [2019]
EWCA Crim 1985) it was argued that a
“malware bug potentially affected its operation.”
© 2020 JDFSL

In the UK, the Criminal Procedure Rules
(Ministry of Justice, 2015) stipulate that
digital forensic practitioners have a duty to
assist the court in their understanding of the
evidence tendered. Therefore, they also have
a duty to identify the capabilities of any malware identified during their investigation and
make a determination as to the bearing it has
(if any) on the conclusions reached.
To undertake this duty (and hence form
an opinion on the impact of any malware),
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the forensic practitioner is reliant on their
tools, skills, and knowledge of malware to
detect, identify and study the behaviour of
any identified malware. However, practitioners are relying on anecdotal or otherwise limited scientific principles to form their conclusions on such impact (Kennedy, 2017). This
is contrary to scientifically based decision
making, which is “an assumed trait of the
practitioner, rather than a formally taught
competency” (Horsman, 2019a).
This is in part due to the lack of an established methodology for malware forensics undertaken as part of a criminal investigation. The unpredictable nature of
malware means this lack of an established
methodology could violate legislation such
as the Computer Misuse Act (1990). It
could also violate technically led best practice guidelines (Williams, 2012) and, more
recently, the quality focused Codes of Practice and Conduct (Forensic Science Regulator, 2020b), hereafter referred to as “the
Codes.”
One aspect of such a methodology is the
approach followed to both select and evaluate the tools used to analyse the malware and the artefacts it produces. Broadly
speaking, there are two approaches used to
study malware: dynamic and static. The
former monitors malware that is operational.
The latter examines malware in a passive
state by studying the underlying code, for
example. Tools will generally support one
(sometimes both) of these approaches. Existing methods to evaluate tools in a conventional digital forensic examination include
‘dual-tool verification’ promoted by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO)
(Clarke, 2009). Arguments that a tool has
been widely accepted in case law (Guidance
Software Inc., 2014) are open to challenge
when examined at a statistically significant
scale (Kennedy, 2017) and limited in their
utility (Horsman, 2019b).
Page 2
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This work provides a foundation to determine if a systematic basis for trusted practice could be established for evaluating malware artefact detection tools used within a
forensic investigation. The contributions of
the work are to (a) identify the legislative,
technical, and quality requirements of malware forensic practice; (b) provide a framework to address these requirements.
The structure of this paper is as follows:
Section 2 explores the background and related work, while section 3 derives the requirements for undertaking malware forensics. Section 4 describes a framework to address these requirements. Section 5 reflects
on the framework and the extent to which
the requirements have been addressed, while
section 6 draws conclusions and identifies
further work.

2. BACKGROUND
AND RELATED WORK
The digital fields of malware and forensics
are increasingly being combined to describe
what Malin et al. (2008) term malware
forensics. As a field of study in its own
right, universities are now beginning to offer
malware forensics either as a whole course/module (University of Portsmouth, 2019) or
as part of related modules, such as Digital
Forensics (University of London, 2020).
The original motivation for this work
arose from the realisation that digital forensic practitioners were conducting malware
forensic investigations in a largely anecdotal manner. This may be in part due to the
fact that there is little published material
establishing a scientific basis for procedures
applied to conducting a malware forensic investigation, and more specifically, for evaluating the tools to do so. Liu et al. (2017) applied malware ontology techniques to assist
investigators by providing a means to categorise malware behaviour in terms of one
© 2020 JDFSL
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of five broad categories. The definitions applied, lack a rationale and do not address
malware that occupies more than one category. Furthermore, while helpful to a lay
audience, the approach does not assist investigators in understanding the impact (if
any) of any malware found on a computer
under investigation.
The use of malware forensics is cited by
Kim et al. (2014), who presented a model
to investigate fraud using “malware forensic”
techniques. Provataki and Katos (2013) offered a framework that extends the functionality of the Cuckoo sandbox (Cuckoo Foundation, 2016) to understand malware’s behaviour but not to evaluate the tools used to
study such behaviour. Shosha et al. (2013)
explored the limitations of dynamic malware analysis techniques for digital investigations, which are highlighted and propose a
methodology to analyse malicious code running in forensically acquired computer memory. However, the methodology proposed is
only applicable to the analysis of code running in memory and is not based on any formal requirements analysis.
A malware analysis approach was proposed by Ianelli et al. (2007), who suggested
that the presence of malware can be addressed by examination of the network traffic logs. However, this suggestion assumes
that such logs are more likely to be found
in a corporate than domestic environment.
Hence, a suspect accused of committing an
offence via their home router will typically
have far fewer logs and detail to assist their
defence than in a commercial environment,
where there would likely be more sophisticated logging available.
Malin et al. (2008) presented one of the
few books on malware forensics, more recently split into separate Windows (2012)
and Linux (2013) editions. Carvey (2012)
also provided some coverage of the topic
across two chapters from an investigative
© 2020 JDFSL
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perspective, as part of a more general digital forensics discussion. Each of these
texts presents a collection of tools and techniques to address various aspects of analysis, but none attempt to develop and evaluate a general-purpose framework for malware analysis or a rigorous, scientific means
to evaluate the tools used.
The lack of a formalised approach means
it is also not uncommon to find tools not
specifically designed for forensic use being
deployed. Hughes and Varol (2020) argued
that the use of malware scanners, employed
to identify malware in a forensic investigation, will not meet all possible functional requirements. For example, such tools are not
designed to detect malware that previously
existed on a machine and is now located in
areas such as slack space, unused partitions,
and deleted files. Thus, the validity of tools
(and hence any resulting conclusions) can be
undermined by their application to scenarios
for which they were not designed.
Perhaps more significantly, the lack of a
formalised approach means that court proceedings involving malware may not be adequately investigated. Such cases will inevitably become a candidate for miscarriages
of justice, as the court would be forming a
judgment without being fully informed of the
facts. Some of the challenges that can impair an investigation involving malware are
explored below.

2.1

The Trojan Defence

Separating user actions from those of malicious software is the fundamental objective when investigating the Trojan defence,
where a defendant can claim the illegal activity recorded on a device is the result of
malware and not their own actions. Brown
(2015) highlighted the Trojan defence as one
of several tactics used by counsel to raise
doubt as to the authenticity of the electronic
evidence presented to the court. Bowles and
Page 3
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Hernandez-Castro (2015) highlighted “clear
and obvious mistakes” with regard to Trojan
defence cases in a study covering a 10 year
period.
The problem of attribution is anticipated
to become more challenging in the near future with the nefarious use of artificial intelligence (AI) to enhance malware. Thanh
and Zelinka (2019) warn of an upcoming ‘AIpowered malware era,’ citing proof of concept work that demonstrates that ‘computational intelligence could be used to enhance
malware. This warning is echoed by Truong
et al. (2020) who identify deep learning techniques being applied to malware.
Bikeev et al. (2019) explored the challenges of applying mens rea to malicious AI
and Bahnsen et al. (2018) developed an algorithm to enhance AI to be more effective
during malicious phishing attacks. Alongside malware and AI, doubt in the reliability
of digital evidence can also originate from
the methodologies followed by forensic practitioners. Perhaps the most significant of
these is an over dependence on anecdotal experience when reaching conclusions.

2.2

Repeated Confirmation

Sceptical digital forensic practitioners may
defer to their anecdotal experience to argue that they are “yet to see an example”
(McLinden, 2009) and similarly that they
“haven’t seen a single case” (Douglas, 2007)
of malware attributed to the downloading
of indecent images of children. Similarly,
the results from mainstream digital forensic tools have been accepted “based solely
on the reputation of the vendor” (Garfinkel,
Farrell, Roussev, & Dinolt, 2009). Such arguments are formulated on inductive reasoning, derived from repeated confirmation. Although useful to develop hypothesises, inductive reasoning cannot be used to test scientific theory (Levitin, 2016). There are also
challenges in the processing and reasoning
Page 4

TOWARDS INCREASING TRUST...

that are applied to expert evidence.

2.3

Ubiquitous Problems
With Expert Evidence

Challenges with the evidence include experts
who step outside of their own expertise. The
now infamous trials of R v Clark [2003]
EWCA Crim 1020, R v Cannings [2004]
EWCA Crim 1 and R v Patel [2003] provide examples of where the defence expert,
Professor Sir Roy Meadows, made a number of claims that had “no statistical basis”
(Royal Statistical Society, 2001). Following
these events, the Law Commission’s review
(2011) of expert evidence in criminal trials
called for a move to incorporate a greater
level of scientific principles and provenance
in expert evidence.
Challenges also arise with failures to find
and/or disclose evidence correctly. Bowcott
(2018) cites problems at a series of criminal
trials where digital evidence was either not
found nor passed to the defence team during
disclosure.
Problems with expert evidence are not
limited to the UK alone. Edmond and Vulle
(2014) examined the use of forensic science
evidence in trials and concluded three separate criminal justice systems (United States,
Switzerland and Australia) each failed to
identify “deep structural and endemic problems with many types of forensic science.”
Edmond and Vulle (2014) go on to argue
that these problems extend to the use of language by experts, stating that the “expressions used by analysts are not empirically
based.” This is echoed by Adam (2016), who
argues that language used for conclusions
such as ‘it is likely is based on posterior probabilities and so implies probabilistic support
to the conclusion. However, such phrases almost never provide any detail on how the
likelihood has been reached. Such a conclusion could be based on unreported proper© 2020 JDFSL
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ties of items considered or entirely subjective. Similarly, Adam (2016) goes on to challenge the phrase ‘is consistent with,’ which
states some (unknown) degree of similarity
between two things. Typically, either no alternative sources are given or a sense of how
common the ‘consistent’ features are in the
wider population. The misuse of language in
this way may be linked to a lack of understanding of the underlying scientific principles by practitioners.

2.4

Lack Of Scientific
Principles

Casey (2019) argues that digital forensics is
distinct from forensic science “despite over a
decade of effort to break down the borders
between them.” He goes on to argue that
some practitioners accept results as “factual,” failing to recognise the need for scientific treatment. This leads to problems in
recognising and reporting error rates, quantifying levels of confidence in findings, or
reporting on alternative interpretations of
findings. Christensen et al. (2014) argue that practitioners appear to have either misunderstood the term ‘error’ or lacked
the skills to apply statistics or the scientific method correctly. They add, practitioners have reportedly claimed either that
there is a zero error rate, that such an error
rate cannot be estimated or that practitioners have attempted to “calculate error rates
post facto.”
The challenges faced by the digital forensics field are exacerbated within the relatively young malware forensics field by issues such as malware routinely obfuscating
its true intentions and hindering attempts
to analyse it (Wagener, Dulaunoy, Engel,
2008). There is, therefore, a level of uncertainty associated with any conclusions drawn
from malware forensics. This uncertainty
can be used to raise a reasonable doubt
© 2020 JDFSL
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about the true nature and intentions of malware. Furthermore, the complexity of the
subject matter and the specialist skills required to study it (e.g., reverse engineering
assembly language) may make the specialty
less accessible to practitioners.
This perceived lack of scientific principles
arguably also informs the methods used by
practitioners to test software tools when attempting to evaluate the reproducibility of
the results reported.

2.5

Reproducibility flaws

Techniques such as dual-tool verification are
used by practitioners to “confirm result integrity during analysis” (Forensic control,
2011). To state that two observations “confirm,” a finding is a bold claim and little
more than an example of repeated confirmation. It also fails to consider the possibility that both tools are incorrect and simply
(erroneously) in agreement (Beckett & Slay,
2007). Hence use of Dual-tool verification in
this way cannot confirm a result, but it can
corroborate it on a statistically insignificant
scale, identifying any discrepancies. An example of this arose in the trial of Anthony
Casey (State of Florida v. Casey Marie Anthony, 2011) where a discrepancy was identified between two Internet history tools used
to produce expert testimony.

2.6

Emerging statutory
requirements

The importance of establishing quality standards for forensic science practice has become increasingly apparent in recent years.
Interest in this has been expressed throughout the European Union (EU) by forensic institutions, the scientific community, as well
as judicial and political stakeholders (van
Ruth Smithuis, 2019).
Consequently, a European Council Framework Decision was passed requiring all memPage 5
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ber states to set up systems to accredit their
forensic service providers carrying out laboratory activities. The UK’s response to this
was to form the post of the Forensic Science
Regulator (FSR). The FSR’s Codes (2020b)
place an obligation on practitioners to gain
accreditation that is mapped to the international standard ISO/IEC 17025 and “embed
a systematic approach to quality” (Tully et
al., 2020).

2.7

Summary

Given the reasons for the appointment of
a FSR and the push to make the quality standards statutory, the issues identified
currently undermine the trust that can be
placed in findings tendered in criminal proceedings.
The production of digital evidence, therefore, requires the use of reliable tools and
competent practitioners who use appropriate scientific language to instill the conditions for trusted practice, particularly when
using tools to analyse malware as part of a
digital forensic investigation.
Given malware forensics is an emerging
field, there is a need to develop a scientific methodology to formalise the practice
and hence underpin trusted practice in the
field. In particular, a methodology to quantifiably evaluate tools used as part of a malware forensic investigation needs to be established. The next section will focus on identifying the requirements for such a methodology.

3. REQUIREMENTS
FOR CONDUCTING
MALWARE FORENSICS
The elicitation of requirements can be done
from multiple sources and not simply stakeholders alone (Burnay, 2016). In his study,
Burnay (2016) found that eliciting requirePage 6
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ments from existing documentation to be
significantly faster than the use of stakeholders. It was also found that there were several
examples of where stakeholders made statements that conflicted with formally documented requirements and so were either incorrect or simply misunderstood by stakeholders.
The use of authoritative document sources
such as legislation and regulatory guidance
already embodies the requirements of stakeholders, and so we took a document study
approach to derive the requirements for conducting malware forensics.
Having considered the methodology, the
issue of addressing trusted practice in malware forensics could begin by better exploring what is meant by trust. This can be
defined as “willingly acting without the full
knowledge needed to act” (Duranti Rogers,
2012). In the context of the Criminal Justice
System involving expert evidence, this translates to a Court coming to a decision on the
reliability of such evidence-based upon two
forms of trust: the expert and their evidence.
The former concerns the expert’s knowledge and skills, as well as their ability to
communicate these effectively and fairly. A
shortfall in one of these areas can impact
the interpretation of the evidence or its probative value (see Problems with expert evidence, above).
The latter relates to the trust placed on
the reliability of the evidence itself. Since the
repeal of section 69 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) issued guidance stating
that any evidence produced by a computer is
presumed to be reliable (CPS, 2014). However, the formation of the FSR and the associated Codes (2020b) indicate that expert
evidence has transitioned from an assumed,
innate trust to one that is now externally
validated. The CPS, FSR, and practitioners
themselves are all stakeholders in this pro© 2020 JDFSL
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cess, each having their own requirements.

3.1

Legal Requirements

As with digital forensic practice in general,
the legal requirements for malware forensic
practice can be divided into lawful practice
and admissibility. For the former, the primary risks are in the handling of the malware
files themselves and potential breaches of the
computer misuse and/or data protection legislation. The latter requires that any output of a tool used to analyse malware which
is tendered as evidence must be admissible.
This broadly translates to a person familiar
with the expected output of a computer being available to give evidence (Lloyd, 2020).
However, few people would be familiar with
the expected output of a tool used to analyse malware, which typically produces unpredictable artefacts.
Guidance on expert evidence from the
CPS (2019) states that expert evidence will
be admissible under common law where:
• It will be of assistance to the court
• The expert has relevant expertise
• The expert is impartial
• The expert evidence is reliable
The first of these requirements concerns the
forming of a judgement on the probative
value of the evidence tendered, whilst the
second and third concern a judgement on
the expert. The last requirement concerns
both the evidence and the manner in which
it was produced. In their guidance, the
CPS defines reliable evidence in terms of it
having a “scientific basis.” This indicates a
scientific methodology characterised by attributes such as repeatability, reproducibility, a testable hypothesis, controllability, and
being unbiased.
Further to the above, the CPS acknowledge that novel techniques are frequently
© 2020 JDFSL

Table 1. R v Lundy Guidelines.

used in a fast-evolving technology discipline
and defer to the recommendations of R v
Lundy ([2013] UKPC 28), see Table 1, referred to hereafter as the “Lundy Guidelines”:
In response to some of the problems outlined in the introduction, regulatory codes of
practice have been introduced.

3.2

Regulatory requirements

Practitioners tendering expert evidence
within the criminal justice system are expected to align their practice to regulatory
standards, namely the Codes published by
the FSR (2020b). Currently, there is no
statutory requirement for practitioners to
align their work to the Codes, but the FSR
is lobbying the UK Government to make
this mandatory (Forensic Science Regulator,
2020a).
The Codes stipulate that software tools
must be validated (Section 24.1.2 of the
Codes) and that an estimate of uncertainty
be provided (Section 22 of the Codes). Furthermore, any reference datasets used to test
tools against should also be reported (Section 23.4 of the Codes). Each of these requirements is now considered in turn.
Validation The Codes define validation as
a means to demonstrate that a “method,
process or device is fit for the specific purPage 7
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pose intended.” Although not specifically
mentioned, the meaning of ‘device’ could
readily be applied to a software device or
tool. However, it is not clear how such validation is performed or what metrics should
be used to inform a decision how ‘fit for purpose’ a device is, e.g., accuracy, repeatability, etc.
One measure readily available is that of error, i.e., the difference between the expected
and observed values (Kat Els, 2012). Malin et al. (2008) point out that the names
of artefacts (such as filenames) are typically
randomly assigned. In light of this, it is
reasonable to expect artefact values to vary
much more than the quantity of artefacts
produced each time a malware binary is executed. Such behaviour can be validated by
repeatedly executing malware and monitoring the quantity of artefacts produced. Furthermore, to quantify and enable a statistical analysis of the error, a methodology for
testing tools used for malware analysis could
examine the difference in artefact quantities,
rather than the values themselves.
Validation of a tool measuring artefacts
produced by malware is complicated by the
fact that malware employs techniques (often termed ‘anti-forensic’) to obfuscate the
truth. Hence ‘ground truth’ is difficult to
establish. One way forward is to compare
what is reported by a tool against an independent and trusted source or ‘oracle.’ This
will require the testing methodology to (a)
determine the expected value from an independent source and (b) be capable of retrieving the observed number of artefacts from a
variety of tools applied to the framework for
testing.
Estimate of uncertainty A measure of
statistical confidence can contribute to an
estimate of uncertainty. One way to calculate this would be to run multiple tests under the same conditions and record the erPage 8
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ror between the expected and observed numbers of artefacts. The rationale behind this
is that the ISO/IEC 17025 Standard (ISO,
2005) upon which the Codes are based derives its definition of uncertainty from the
Guide to the Expression of Uncertainty in
Measurement (GUM), produced by the Joint
Committee for Guides in Metrology (JCGM)
(2008). In this document, uncertainty is defined in terms of the “dispersion of the values” associated with an observable quantity.
Acknowledging the two components of error
(systematic and random), they add that random error “. . . can usually be reduced by increasing the number of observations”. Furthermore, calculating the experimental standard deviation “of the arithmetic mean or
average of a series of observations” provides
“a measure of the uncertainty of the mean
due to random effects.”
Hence, by running sufficient tests, it would
be possible to plot frequency distributions
with associated confidence intervals. Similarly, by varying the conditions of tests, it
would become possible to see the impact of
such changes upon the level of uncertainty
in the results.
Reference data sets Becket (2010) states
there is a “need” for forensic practitioners to
demonstrate that “certified reference materials” have been used to evaluate their tools,
citing Section 5.6.3.2 of the ISO/IEC 17025
Standard (ISO, 2005). This is not quite
accurate as the same section of the Standard states this should be done “where possible.” Section 21.2.64(h) of the Codes requires
there to be a plan in place for the use of such
data. A number of attempts over the years
have been made by the scientific community to address the lack of standardised test
data; these include test images produced by
Carrier (2010), the Computer Forensic Reference Data Sets (CFReDS) project (NIST,
2016), and the Digital Corpora (2017) de© 2020 JDFSL
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veloped by Garfinkel et al. (2009) as an
extensive collection of both fabricated and
real data. However, there are also datasets
that include malware samples, such as contagion (2020) and VirusShare (2020) these
(like those above) are not labelled as being
certified.
Aside from legal and regulatory requirements, the handling and analysis of malware reveal a number of technical requirements identified by the literature for malware forensics practice.

3.3

Practice requirements

The following practice requirements have
been identified:
Virtual Machines Malin et al. (2008)
recommend the use of Virtual Machines
(VMs), particularly as this provides testing
at scale and speed. Hence greater numbers
of tests can be performed for repeatability
or breadth of testing purposes. To facilitate
this, testing should be automated as far as
practically possible. In addition, to minimise
the risk of malware escaping from a Windows Guest VM (Tank, Aggarwal, Chaubey,
2019), a Linux host should be used.
In considering the use of virtual machines,
it should be noted that malware can detect
virtual environments and change their behaviour or even become ‘misleading’ (Ferrie, 2007). However, it is also noted that in
recognition of the ubiquitous use of virtual
servers, a shift in malware no longer avoiding virtual environments has also taken place
(Wueest, 2014).
Network services Isolating malware
from a network or even the Internet
could limit the behaviour exhibited (Deng
Mirkovic, 2018). To counter this, it is a
good idea to provide the malware with as
many services as possible that it is likely
to rely upon, such as SMTP, HTTP, and
DNS. The use of iNetSim (Hungenberg
© 2020 JDFSL
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Eckert, 2016) is a popular choice in this
area. Phu et al. (2019) use it to trap DNS
queries from malware under analysis using
an iNetSim simulated network; Sikorski
Honig (2012) use it to simulate a broader
range of network services; a mixed solution
is proposed by Palkmets et al. (2014) who
additionally provide a route to the Internet
via an onion router network; a malware
clustering technique is offered by Fang et al.
(2020) who use iNetSim to provide a means
to identify the family of malware under
analysis.
Vulnerable environment Alongside network services, vulnerable environments are
also key to maximising the behaviour of malware (Szor, 2005). This is echoed by Malin
et al. (2008) and Elisan (2015), who goes
further and anecdotally promote the use of
“malware friendly” configurations. These include assigning administrator rights to the
default user account, disabling auto updates,
disabling User Access Control (UAC), setting the Internet browser to the minimum
security level, installing commonly exploited
software, and creating honeypot files with
filenames such as “salaries.xls.”
Black box testing Many of the tools used
by digital forensic practitioners, including
the mainstream forensic software tools, are
closed source (Talib, 2018). Hence there is
no access to verify the underlying algorithms
used (Horsman, 2019b). Therefore, a black
box testing strategy is more viable than a
white box testing approach. Furthermore,
digital forensic practitioners would have neither the time nor the skills to review source
code (Horsman, 2020).
The above requirements have been included in the framework and are summarised
in Table 2.
With the requirements identified, the following section will identify the aims of a
framework to test tools used for malware
Page 9
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forensics in light of the above requirements.

4.

DESIGN OF THE
FRAMEWORK

Having identified the requirements for conducting malware forensics, it follows that the
aims for a framework to address these requirements also need to be determined.

4.1

Aims

Malware investigations can use a variety of
software tools, some of which make claims
to be suited for malware analysis. The proposed framework, referred to as the Malware Analysis Tool Evaluation Framework
(MATEF), should provide a mechanism to
evaluate these tools by quantifying their
ability to detect artefacts produced by realworld malware samples (see Aim 1, Table 3).
Malin et al. (2008) argued that mawlare
analysis could be divided into three broad
techniques: temporal, relational, and functional analysis. Temporal analysis is concerned with the timeline of events surrounding reported activity, while relational analysis refers to the interaction between components of the malware and its environment.
Finally, functional analysis relates to the actions the malware is reported to have performed.
The MATEF provides a mechanism to
evaluate dynamic analysis software tools. It
provides a means to measure the extent to
which tools detect the artefacts produced by
malware behaviour (see Aim 2, Table 3). On
a Windows computer, this behaviour typically manifests itself in the form of file, registry, process, and network based artefacts.
Unlike regular software that is largely predictable, malware can be unpredictable in
that some behaviour (and hence artefacts)
may not be observed. This can happen
when the required (and unknown) trigger
conditions for a given binary are not met
Page 10

(Nataraj, Karthikeyan, Jacob, Manjunath,
2011). Thus, the behaviour of malware can
be nondeterministic and vary, particularly if
it is of a type that communicates with a
Command and Control (CC) server (Akinrolabu, Agrafiotis, Erola, 2018).
Furthermore, malware can include ‘measures to impede automatic and manual analyses’ (D’Elia, Coppa, Palmaro, Cavallaro,
2020). Strategies include code obfuscation
(Singh Singh, 2018), detection of debuggers or virtual machines (Chen, Huygens,
Desmet, Joosen, 2016), and deployment
of ‘split-personality’ malware techniques to
change the behaviour of code when it is subjected to analysis (Murali, Ravi, Agarwal,
2020). Such techniques are designed to give
misleading results under analysis. Hence
mitigation against such risks should be considered when drawing conclusions from the
testing of tools used to study malware, see
Aim 3, Table 3.
Having identified the aims of the framework, consideration was then given as to how
to achieve these aims. Hence, the following
section seeks to identify the main components of the framework.

Table 2. Aims of the framework.

4.2

Identifying selecting the
main components of the
framework

The MATEF framework includes a number
of components to satisfy the aims identified
in Table 3. Each of these elements is briefly
© 2020 JDFSL
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Table 3. Proposed requirements.

explored in the following sections, starting
with the malware binaries themselves.
Malware sample source To maximise
the validity of the evaluation process, realworld malware (a.k.a. malware ‘in the wild’)
© 2020 JDFSL

is used instead of fabricated malware (see
Aim 1, Table 3). The stored malware employs password protected zip files to minimise the contamination risk during handling
(see Requirement 1, Table 2). All samples
Page 11
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are analysed offline (see Requirement 1, Table 2). Malware can be obtained from any
source and imported into the malware library.
Malware library The malware library is
a store of malware executables, each accessible through a consistent file naming convention, thus facilitating automation and use
of VMs (see Requirement 10, Table 2). Access to this library is restricted to authorised
users of the framework only (see Requirement 1, Table 2).
In addition to the malware binary file, information on its expected behaviour should
also be stored locally as well (satisfying requirement 14 from Table 2). To be made
readily available, this information will be
stored in a malware database.
Malware
database The
malware
database stores properties of each malware binary held in the malware library. As
a minimum, the details stored include the
hash value of the binary and the number of
artefacts generated as a result of creating,
modifying, or deleting files or registry keys.
In addition, also stored are the number
of ports opened and processes spawned as
a result of executing the malware using
automation scripts.
Manager scripts The manager scripts
perform two fundamental roles. The first of
these is the management of the database and
the tool testing process, through tasks such
as initiating a bank of virtual machines (see
Requirement 10, Table 2). The second role
is the movement of software tools and malware into the VMs and extraction of log files
created out of these environments.
The Oracle Due to the lack of any theoretical or easily determined ‘ground truth,’
the MATEF determines the expected quantity of artefacts from an independent source
(see Requirement 14, Table 2). The random
Page 12
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nature of the artefacts generated by malware is such that the reported expected value
is little more than an approximation of the
‘ground truth.’ This source referred to as the
‘Oracle’ could conceivably be any one of a
number of online environments, such as that
provided by F-Secure (2011) and JoeSandbox (2020).
Unlike online sandbox solutions to analyse malware, use of offline tools enables the
investigator greater control of the test environment. Control measures include the configuration of virtual machines and the ability
to run tests repeatedly over extended periods of time to identify predictable artefacts.
The investigator can also control the distribution of potential personally identifiable information that may be hard coded into a
custom-built malware binary. This mitigates
the risk whereby malware authors may become alerted to an ongoing investigation by
publishing such binaries to a public online
platform (C. H. Malin et al., 2008).
Test environment The test environment
is managed via automated scripts and enables multiple tests to be run in parallel
and thus reduce the time required for large
scale tool testing. In addition, this improves
the statistical power (and hence the statistical significance) of the results (Smith, 2012)
to address the anticipated variability of the
malware under analysis.
Internet simulation The provision of
network services (see Requirement 11, Table 2) provides the MATEF with an added
level of realism to malware running within
the Test Environment. Lee et al. (2019) report that as of 2017, over 90It is important
this network provision is simulated to minimise any risk of the malware stealing any
data or committing any unauthorised access
to other networks (see Requirement 1, Table
2). Requests and responses should be passed
to and from common network services that
© 2020 JDFSL
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are exposed to the test environment through
the component.
Logs of network activity, together with
those generated by the tool under test, form
a significant product of the test environment
and feed into the analysis component.
Analysis component In order to undertake analysis of a software tool, the analysis
component needs to establish three things.
The first of these is to establish what the
tool is to be compared against. As argued
above, this should be the expected quantity
(‘Expected value’) of artefacts observed, as
opposed to their value.
Secondly, the analysis component needs
the capability to extract the number of artefacts observed (‘Observed value’) by the tool
under test from a log file bearing a filename
that can be determined programmatically.
This will allow multiple log files from different VMs and test runs to coexist (see Requirement 15, Table 2).
A third analysis requirement was that the
analysis components must establish an assessment of the difference between the Expected and Observed values (see Requirement 7, Table 2). This is a critical value and
contributes to establishing the validity of the
tool under test. Variation of this value under repeated testing also provides a measure
of the repeatability.
Summary Figure 1 shows how the components described above are combined to form
the MATEF, together with the information
flows between the components. Note boxes
in grey are external components that currently sit outside the MATEF. At present,
the statistical analysis component is performed using an independent statistical analysis tool. It is envisaged that future development of the MATEF will include a statistical component within the MATEF. The next
section will discuss and evaluate the extent
to which the design of the framework has
© 2020 JDFSL
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met these requirements.

5.

DISCUSSION

The discussion below reviews the framework
requirements, which are reproduced in Table
4, together with a summary of the discussion
points below.
The majority of the requirements are met
by the design of the framework; for example,
by handling the malware binaries via scripts
on a closed network, access to the malware is
restricted and minimises any accidental cross
contamination during testing (Requirement
1). In addition, the use of virtual machines
provides a platform for rapidly testing and
resetting test environments, addressing Requirement 10, while the use of an Internet
simulator addresses Requirement 11 to provide a network service enabled environment
conducive to executing malware. Similarly,
the framework enables the use of a variety
of operating systems, particularly those that
are deemed more vulnerable, such as Windows XP (Requirement 12).
The design of the framework also dispenses with the need to have knowledge of
the internal operation of a tool under test,
reflecting the real-world practice where practitioners use closed source tools. Instead, the
framework provides a means to test the expected output of a tool under test (Requirement 13).
However, there are also some requirements
(Requirements 2, 5, and 6) that can only be
fulfilled after the work is released to the community for review and consideration of use
in practice. As a result, there is scope for
further work to evaluate these (see Further
Work in the next section).
The provision for reliability (Requirement
3) is comprised of the four elements of reliability, as defined by R v Lundy ([2013]
UKPC 28), see Table 4. For simplicity, these
will hereafter be referred to as the ‘Lundy
Page 13
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Figure 1. MATEF components.
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requirements’ and identified individually as
‘L1’ through to ‘L4’, respectively.
These four elements are summarised in Table 4 against Requirement 3. Two of these
four have been addressed by the design of
the framework and are indicated by check
marks ‘X’ in Table 4. First, the capability for testing a technique (see Requirement
3, L1 in Table 4) is addressed by the design of the framework. Secondly, the rate of
error associated with a given software tool
observing malware artefacts can be determined through repeated measurements and
the use of statistical techniques (see Requirement 3, L3 in Table 4). The remaining two
elements of the Lundy requirements in Table
4 (L2 and L4) were not addressed and so are
marked with a cross ‘X’ in Requirement 3
of Table 4. These unaddressed requirements
mirror Requirements 5 and 6 of the framework discussed above.
By publishing the hashes of malware samples sourced from openly shareable resources
such as VirusTotal (2010) and using these
during the testing of tools, practitioners
are able to collaboratively test their tools
against the same known and trusted datasets
(Requirement 9). Similarly, practitioners
can use the same independent source to determine the expected number of artefacts
that are generated for a given malware binary (Requirement 14). The design of the
framework also allows for these artefacts to
be recorded and counted from a disparate
range of tools that are subject to testing (Requirement 15).
However, the use of an independent source
is not without its problems. Critics of the
framework will point to how the requirements for validation (Requirements 4 and 7)
have yet to be fully addressed, given the dependence on a third-party tool to provide
‘ground truth.’ The approach of comparing
the results of one tool with that of another
(online) one is little more than dual-tool ver© 2020 JDFSL
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ification.
Despite this, the framework’s test environment provides a means to test tools under
different conditions repeatedly at scale on
large numbers of malware binaries. This enables statistical techniques to be applied and
thus establish greater confidence in an observed value to a statistically significant degree. This capability facilitates the response
to the requirement to provide an estimate for
uncertainty (Requirement 8).
Despite the ability to control the frequency and conditions under which the malware is executed locally, it should be noted
that the use of online sandboxes to quantify
the number of expected artefacts for a given
category (i.e., creation, change, or deletion)
has one notable limitation: rather than providing a representative average quantity, online sandbox tools may only execute samples
once and for no more than a maximum time
duration before terminating (Bayer, Habibi,
Balzarotti, Kirda, Kruegel, 2009). However,
the limitation is attributed to the use of online sandboxes and not of the framework proposed here. The use of online sandboxes was
one of convenience, speed, and choice (given
the variety of online tools available). Additionally, further work is possible here to integrate an offline sandbox, which is under the
control of the investigator, to have greater
control in how ‘ground truth’ is established.
We discuss this in the next section.

6. CONCLUSIONS
AND FURTHER WORK
Despite the caveats identified previously, the
framework is a versatile platform enabling
experiments to be designed according to
user-defined protocols. One example is determining the standard deviation from the
repeated execution of malware, hence providing an estimate of uncertainty. Indeed,
Hubbard (2014, p. 162) points out that
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where there is a lot of uncertainty in a quantity, then very little data is needed to reduce the uncertainty significantly. Hence,
producing an estimate of the expected number of artefacts to be observed significantly
reduces the uncertainty in what is expected
from subsequent observations.
Support is currently limited to tools that
examine file, registry, and network artefacts,
such as those in the Sysinternals suite (Microsoft, 2020). The tool under test must be
capable of being initiated and configured (if
needed) via command line. To capture the
output of the tool, it must also provide a
means to export a log file (in any text-based
format). Future work could extend the support to GUI based tools.
The framework is in an early stage of its
life-cycle and so further work to critically
review and (where appropriate) adopt the
framework elsewhere would contribute towards addressing the requirements of the
framework relating to critique and general
acceptance.
Additional further work could also include
the development of an offline oracle. This
would provide greater control over parameters, such as execution times and the number of runs to better define and hence establish ground truth. A community validated oracle of reference data would provide the greatest level of confidence in the
results of the MATEF and could be based
on existing projects such as MAEC (Kirillov,
Beck, Chase, Martin, 2010) and (‘YARA’,
n.d.). Improving how ground truth is determined in this way also has the potential to
improve the validation requirements of the
framework.
There is also scope to harden the virtual
environment to minimise detection and evasive behaviour by malware. Furthermore, future work can be done to validate the framework by implementing and testing it with
empirical data. Finally, there is room to also
Page 16
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engage with practitioners and other stakeholders to gather feedback on the identified
requirements and design.
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Table 4. Review of requirements.
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